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Abstract
Simulating musical creativity using computers needs more than
the ability to devise elegant computational implementations of so-
phisticated algorithms. It requires, firstly, an understanding of what
phenomena might be regarded as music; and, secondly, an understand-
ing of the nature of such phenomena — including their evolutionary
history, their recursive-hierarchic structure, and the mechanisms by
which they are transmitted within cultural groups. To understand
these issues it is fruitful to compare human music, and indeed human
language, with analogous phenomena in other areas of the animal
kingdom. Whale song, specifically that of the humpback (Megaptera
novaeangeliae), possesses many structural and functional similarities
to human music (as do certain types of birdsong). Using a memetic
perspective, this paper compares the “musilanguage” of humpbacks
with the music of humans, and aims to identify a number of shared
characteristics. A consequence of nature and nurture, these common-
alities appear to arise partly from certain constraints of perception
and cognition (and thus they determine an aspect of the environment
within which the “musemes” (musical memes) constituting whale vo-
calizations and human music is replicated), and partly from the social-
emotive-embodied and sexual-selective nature of musemic transmis-
sion. The paper argues that Universal-Darwinian forces give rise to
uniformities of structure in phenomena we might regard as “music”,
irrespective of the animal group — certain primates, cetaceans or birds
-– within which it occurs. It considers the extent to which whale song
might be regarded as creative, by invoking certain criteria used to
assess this attribute in human music. On the basis of these various
comparisons, the paper concludes by attempting to draw conclusions
applicable to those engaged in designing evolutionary music simula-
tion/generation algorithms.
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1 Introduction
Leaving aside the use of computers for the analysis of music, the computer
synthesis of music – conducted variously under the rubrics of Evolutionary
Computation (Miranda, 2004), Computer Simulation of Musical Evolution
(CSME) (Gimenes & Miranda, 2011), and Musical Metacreation (MUME)
(Eigenfeldt, Bown, Pasquier, & Martin, 2013), among others – has made
rapid progress over the last fifteen years. Whatever the method underlying
the synthesis – recombination (Cope, 2001), genetic algorithms (O¨zcan &
Erc¸al, 2008), crowd-sourcing (MacCallum, Mauch, Burt, & Leroi, 2012) or
biocomputation (Miranda, 2014) – music simulation systems have expanded
the boundaries of computation and have produced music which is interesting
and convincing.
Whilst not wishing to diminish its success, a significant portion of this
work has arguably been conducted with too much focus on the mechanics
of computation and on the aesthetic appeal of the end products, and with
insufficient reflection on the evolutionary-functional context of what is being
attempted. In particular, music is often taken as an immutable, Platonic
“given”, with little consideration of its evolutionary history or function; how
it relates to language, meaning and physicality; or how these aetiological
factors impinge upon the methodologies chosen for its simulation. In saying
this, I am referring to those simulations which aim to produce music which
is recognizable and comprehensible to humans. While I am not denying the
possibility of “non-anthropocentric” creativity (Velardo & Vallati, 2016) –
the generation of music which is beyond humans’ perceptual-cognitive reach,
and which might only be produced or appreciated by machines – it remains
at present largely a theoretical possibility.
2 “Social-Emotive” Vocalizations as Music
and Language
What we term “music” is related to what we term “language” not as discrete
and distinct categories, but as opposite ends of a continuum of social-emotive
vocalizations (Morley, 2012, p. 127) (which include “infant-directed speech”
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(Dissanayake, 2008)). In early hominins (modern humans and our immediate
ancestors) a “protolanguage”, or “musilanguage” (Brown, 2000), appears to
have slowly diverged (beginning c. 200,000 years ago) into music and lan-
guage, with the emotive, melodic and rhythmic aspects of the protolanguage
becoming more concentrated in music, and the social, semantic and syntac-
tic aspects becoming more concentrated in language (Mithen, 2006). Despite
this divergence, both preserve traces of their protolinguistic ancestor: music
retains certain lexical/grammatical elements (such as combinatorial rules of
chord progression and phrase concatenation); and language retains certain
melodic/emotional elements (such as the presence of intonation in a majority
of languages, and pitch inflexion even in non-tonal languages).
Brown hypothesises the relationship between language and music as shown
in Figure 1, which represents two levels at which music and language operate.
• The phonological level in language concerns phonemes and their assem-
bly into words and phrases. In music this level concerns pitches and
their assembly into motifs and phrases.
• The meaning level in language relates to “propositional syntax”, which
“specifies temporal and behavioral relationships between subjects and
objects in a phrase” and which “is based on relationships between actors
and those acted upon” (Brown, 2000, pp. 292–293, 296). In music this
level relates to “pitch-blending syntax” (Brown, 2000, p. 274), which
correlates sound structures with their expressive effects.
At its far left-hand side, the continuum (top part of Figure 1) represents
language as the use of sound for referential meaning and, at its far right-hand
side, represents music – in its “acoustic mode” (Brown, 2000, p. 271) – as
the use of sound for emotive meaning. Even though “pure” language and
“pure” music are never wholly unmixed, there are a number of intermediate
states between these two extremes, which afford evidence that the bifurcation
of musilanguage is not (yet) total and that there are therefore modes of
communication which, while primarily linguistic, retain significant traces of
musicality, and vice versa.
3 Segmentation, Musemes/Lexemes, and
Recursive-Hierarchical Structuring in Mu-
sic and Language
Music and language divide a sound-stream into discrete particles owing to the
segmentational pressures described by gestalt psychology (Deutsch, 1999),
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Figure 1: The Music-Language Continuum (Brown, 2000, p. 275, Figure 16.1)
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specifically the phenomenon of “chunking” (Snyder, 2000, pp. 53–56). One
might term these particles “musemes” (musical memes) and “lexemes” (lan-
guage memes), respectively (Jan, 2007, 2015a). Both are implicated in syn-
tactic structure and referential function (stronger in language than in music);
and both possess emotional-expressive content (stronger in music than in lan-
guage). Given this segmentational tendency, and the consequent formation of
particulate entities from a larger pool of sonic “raw materials”, it is likely that
at some point in our prehistory the Variation-Replication-Selection (VRS) al-
gorithm (Dennett, 1995, p. 343) “booted up”, a “Universal Darwinian” pro-
cess (Dawkins, 1983) was initiated, and music/linguistic-cultural evolution
followed.
An almost inevitable consequence of Universal Darwinism is the gener-
ation of multilevelled structures from “flat”, undifferentiated raw materials
(be they the amino acids of DNA, or the sound fragments of musemes or
lexemes) upon which it operates. Such recursive-hierarchical organization
arises from the “nesting” of chunks at a given level within a chunk at the
next higher level (Snyder, 2000, p. 54–55) and the associated evolution of
a syntax to regulate it. Kirby’s computer simulations of language evolution
have verified the feasibility of this process (Kirby & Hurford, 2002; Kirby,
2013). In human music, for example, uniparametric “style forms/shapes”
conglomerate to form multiparametric “style structures” (Narmour, 1990,
p. 34). These short units coalesce into phrases, which then assemble into
larger structural sections, and so on, up to the global level of the movement
or work (Jan, 2010).
4 Whale Song as Musilanguage
The acid test of Universal Darwinism is, obviously enough, its universality.
While it is a hypothesis which is intrinsically difficult to falsify (Popper,
1959), one can buttress it by amassing – as, analogously, “traditional” evolu-
tionary biologists have (Ridley, 2004, Chapter 3) – a large body of evidence
in its favour. Some such evidence comes in the form of animal vocalizations
– some zoomusicologists refer to them as “music(s)” – the study of which
reveals a number of characteristics which are directly analogous to human
music and language, and which are therefore pertinent to their computer
simulation (Kirke, 2011).
Like human music and language, the song of the humpback whale (Mega-
ptera novaeangeliae) has a recursive-hierarchical structure: a series of dis-
tinct musilinguistic entities, in combination, engender a structure at the next
higher level (Whitehead & Rendell, 2014). (Many of the following observa-
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tions on whale song apply equally to the songs of certain bird species (Fitch,
2009; Earp & Maney, 2012).) In Payne’s formulation, shown in Figure 2,
the basic building block is the unit, a single sound parcel (≡ note) with a
specific pitch shape, timbre and duration. Units are combined into phrases
(≡ longer “protemes”) of up to fifteen seconds’ duration. Phrases normally
have at least six units and may be divided into subphrases (≡ shorter pro-
temes) of up to seven seconds’ duration, each with a normal minimum of
three units. Two or more phrases are combined, sometimes by repetition,
into themes of up to two minutes’ duration. Themes assemble, in groups
of up to ten, to form the songs themselves, lasting up to twelve minutes.
If a song is repeated without a significant pause, it forms a song session,
the longest recorded example of which is over twenty hours (Payne, 2000,
pp. 136–137).
While the songs of different humpback groups are dissimilar in con-
tent, owing to variations in the configuration of their sub/phrases, the basic
recursive-hierarchical structure remains constant across the species. This im-
plies a genetic foundation for vocalization similar to the perceptual-cognitive
constraints operative in humans (Lerdahl, 1992) and partly regulated by the
“FOXP2” gene (Carroll, 2003). Perhaps the genetic basis for segmentation is
common to certain primates and cetaceans, being an “ancestral homology”
(Ridley, 2004, p. 431). Beyond inter -pod differences, there is also evidence
of intra-pod variation. Comparing the same pod over successive years, their
songs change, and this occurs during the active (summer) singing period and
not as a result of inter-migration (winter) forgetting (Payne, 2000, p. 139).
Specifically, there is mutation of sub/phrases (adding/deleting/modifying
units) and, at a higher hierarchical level, there is mutation of themes (by
means of substitution of sub/phrases) (Payne, 2000, pp. 138–139). While the
biological context for this mutability is sexual selection – songs are produced
by males as part of mate-attraction/competition rituals (Parsons, Wright,
& Gore, 2008) – the changes are cultural-evolutionary : there is a genetic
foundation for all animal vocalizations but the kind of “creative” mutability
observed in humans and whales is almost always driven by some form of
memetic evolution.
Whale vocalizations are presently neither musical nor linguistic but, on
account of having attributes of both forms of communication, proto/musi-
linguistic. Perhaps they will bifurcate at some point in the future, as is
hypothesized to have happened in hominins, into even more complex and
lyrical whale music and fully compositional – segmented, syntactic – whale
language. There are several caveats to this, however. For one thing, mu-
sic is an intentional object (Dennett, 1989): a dog is presumably oblivious
to music as music because humans interpret its sound patterns in ways the
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Figure 2: The Hierarchical Structure of Whale Song (Payne, 2000, p. 137, Figure 9.1)
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dog cannot. More fundamentally, intentionality, not only in the engagement
with music but also in the production and reception of language, presupposes
consciousness.
A future whale language would therefore imply whale consciousness; or
at least it would require – to reiterate Brown’s assertion – a developed form
of “propositional syntax . . . based on relationships between actors and those
acted upon”. Such syntax appears a likely consequence of those numerous
systems of social organization where animals must negotiate relationships in
the ultimate service of their individual selfish genetic advantage. Indeed,
Carruthers (2002) hypothesizes that propositional syntax itself underpins
and motivates consciousness, arguing that
[all] non-domain-specific [conscious and unconscious] thinking oper-
ates by accessing and manipulating the representations of the lan-
guage faculty. More specifically, the claim is that [all] non-domain-
specific [conscious and unconscious] thoughts implicate representa-
tions in what Chomsky . . . calls ‘logical form’ (LF). Where these rep-
resentations are only in LF, the thoughts in question will be non-
conscious ones. But where the LF representation is used to generate
a full-blown phonological representation (an imagined sentence), the
thought will generally be conscious. (Carruthers, 2002, pp. 658, 666;
emphasis in the original)
As represented in Figure 3, domain-specific thought (e.g., a whale’s con-
ceptions of geometry (the pod’s position in relation to other pods, for in-
stance) and number (of conspecifics in the pod, for instance) could eventu-
ally be integrated by the kind of domain-general LF underpinning human
language. If the protemes already constituting whale vocalizations come to
“token” such a LF, it would then be potentially accessible to a whale’s ToM
(Theory of Mind) module (if and when evolved) and thus made conscious.
Given this, and as Blackmore would argue, a whale would then be able to
answer in the affirmative the question “[a]m I conscious now?” (Blackmore,
2005, p. 27).
5 Creativity in Whale Song
As cultural evolution finds high-level novelty – and thus an expansion of
society’s conceptual and expressive vocabulary – by means of processes oper-
ating viamemetically based Darwinism, so biological evolution finds low-level
novelty – and thus an expansion of its replicators’/vehicles’/species’ survival
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Figure 3: Thought, Modularity and Language (Jan, 2015a, p. 16, Figure 1)
Figure 1: Thought, Modularity and Language 
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“vocabulary” – by means of processes operating via genetically based Darwin-
ism. In this sense, the problem-space exploration characteristic of evolution
is a form of creativity.
It is tempting to term thisDarwinian creativity but because, in an Universal-
Darwinian view, all creativity – natural and cultural – is driven by the VRS
algorithm, the term is tautological. If creativity is a process of generating
novelty such that (i) new ways of connecting existing elements within a prob-
lem space are found; or (ii) new areas of a problem space are investigated ; or
(iii) a problem space is redesigned in order to locate more radical solutions,
then these three categories – Boden’s combinational, exploratory and trans-
formational creativity, respectively (Boden, 2004, pp. 3–6) – readily describe
processes intrinsic to (Universal) Darwinism.
Whale song arguably involves all three forms of creativity: its sub/phrases
are assortatively recombined; the “hypervolume” (Dawkins, 2006, p. 65) of all
possible songs is progressively explored; and the systemic level of organization
may, in principle, be transformed by the power of the VRS algorithm to
expand the range of replicable combinations of units and sub/phrases – thus,
a whale analogue to tonality might, in principle, become an analogue to
atonality (Jan, 2015b).
6 Conclusion: Some Lessons for the Com-
puter
Simulation of Musical Evolution
This discussion has said little on the computer simulation of musical evolution
itself, but the observations made are, I would suggest, directly relevant to all
who seek to use computers to emulate human creativity. In summary:
• Universal Darwinism allows us to regard seemingly dissimilar phenom-
ena using the same conceptual framework. The sounds of music, the
sounds of words, and certain vocalization of animals arguably devolve
to the same thing: they are replicated cultural patterns, or pro/mus/
lexemes.
• Most animal vocalizations are social-emotive: they communicate vis-
ceral feelings, often apropos relationships with conspecifics. This at-
tribute is burned into music and language as well – we can usually tell
from somebody’s tone of voice whether they are happy or sad, even if
the words they use say the opposite; and the character of a piece of
music is usually readily discernible.
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• A special feature of language is that social-emotive sound-parcels be-
came associated (either “iconically” or “indexically” (Tolbert, 2001))
with objects in the real world and concepts arising from interaction
with these objects, giving complex semantics – and a necessarily richer
syntax – on top of the existing phonology.
• To social and emotive, one should add embodied (Shapiro, 2011): music
and physical movement are inseparable and – as further evidenced by
primate vocalizations and their associated movements (Fitch, 2006) –
are likely to have been so for early hominins.
• It is likely that whale song is at the stage in its evolution reached by
early hominins around the point of the bifurcation of musilanguage
into their current trajectories. Whales await the “cognitive revolution”
(Harari, 2014, p. 22), itself partly driven by (musi)language, which
bootstraps this process.
The implications of these points for computer simulations of music are
that:
• Simulations should ensure that the fundamental musical units manip-
ulated by the system make perceptual-cognitive sense, certainly if the
emulation of anthropocentric/zoocentric creativity is intended.
• Simulations should attempt to incorporate not just the phonetic and
syntactic dimensions, but also the semantic. In this way the resulting
music makes contact with the social-emotive-embodied (musilinguistic)
dimension central in the early evolution of music.
• Simulations should also recognize the element of sexual selection (Miranda,
Kirby, & Todd, 2003). While certainly not the whole story, it is likely
that human music – and almost certainly whale song – evolved partly
as a result of male displays of reproductive fitness (Miller, 2000).
These “shoulds” are not intended to sound authoritarian and peremptory;
but if recreating a similar, albeit “counterfactual”, path to that taken by
human music is the aim of computer simulations (and other aims and other
strategies are possible and valuable), then it makes sense to go with the grain
of Universal Darwinism; to try to (re)connect music with sociality, emotion
and physicality; and to see music and language, and their common social-
emotive-embodied driving forces, as two sides of the same evolutionary coin.
11
References
Blackmore, S. J. (2005). Consciousness: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Boden, M. A. (2004). The Creative Mind: Myths and Mechanisms (2nd edn
ed.). London and New York: Routledge.
Brown, S. (2000). The “Musilanguage” Model of Musical Evolution. In
N. L. Wallin, B. Merker, & S. Brown (Eds.), The origins of music (pp.
271–300). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Carroll, S. B. (2003). Genetics and the Making of Homo Sapiens. Nature,
422 (6934), 849–857.
Carruthers, P. (2002, January). The Cognitive Functions of Lan-
guage. Behavioral and Brain Sciences , 25 , 657–726. Retrieved from
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X02000122 doi: 10.1017/
S0140525X02000122
Cope, D. (2001). Virtual Music: Computer Synthesis of Musical Style.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Dawkins, R. (1983). Universal Darwinism. In D. S. Bendall (Ed.), Evo-
lution from molecules to men (pp. 403–425). Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Dawkins, R. (2006). The Blind Watchmaker. London: Penguin.
Dennett, D. C. (1989). The Intentional Stance. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Dennett, D. C. (1995). Darwin’s Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Mean-
ings of Life. London: Penguin.
Deutsch, D. (1999). Grouping Mechanisms in Music. In D. Deutsch (Ed.),
The psychology of music (2nd ed., pp. 299–348). San Diego, CA: Aca-
demic Press.
Dissanayake, E. (2008). If Music is the Food of Love, What About Sur-
vival and Reproductive Success? Musicae Scientiae, 12 (Special Is-
sue: Narrative in Music and Interaction), 169–195. doi: 10.1177/
1029864908012001081
Earp, S. E., & Maney, D. L. (2012). Birdsong: Is it Music to their Ears?
Frontiers in Evolutionary Neuroscience, 4 . doi: 10.3389/fnevo.2012
.00014
Eigenfeldt, A., Bown, O., Pasquier, P., & Martin, A. (2013). Towards a
Taxonomy of Musical Metacreation: Reflections on The First Musi-
cal Metacreation Weekend. In Proceedings of the second international
workshop on musical metacreation (mume-2013), in conjunction with
the ninth annual aaai conference on artificial intelligence and inter-
active digital entertainment (aiide-13). AAAI Press. Retrieved from
http://philippepasquier.com/
12
Fitch, W. T. (2006). The Biology and Evolution of Music: A Comparative
Perspective. Cognition, 100 (1), 173–215. Retrieved from http://www
.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/16412411 doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2005
.11.009
Fitch, W. T. (2009). Animal Behaviour: Birdsong Normalized by Culture.
Nature, 459 , 519–520. doi: 10.1038/459519a
Gimenes, M., & Miranda, E. R. (2011). An Ontomemetic Approach to
Musical Intelligence. In E. R. Miranda (Ed.), A-life for music: Music
and computer models of living systems (pp. 261–286). Middleton, WI:
A-R Editions.
Harari, Y. N. (2014). Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind. London:
Harvill Secker.
Jan, S. B. (2007). The Memetics of Music: A Neo-Darwinian View of
Musical Structure and Culture. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Jan, S. B. (2010). Memesatz contra Ursatz: Memetic Perspectives on the Ae-
tiology and Evolution of Musical Structure. Musicae Scientiae, 14 (1),
3–50.
Jan, S. B. (2015a). From Holism to Compositionality: Memes and the Evolu-
tion of Segmentation, Syntax and Signification in Music and Language.
Language and Cognition, 7 (1), 1–38. doi: doi:10.1017/langcog.2015.1
Jan, S. B. (2015b). Memetic Perspectives on the Evolution of Tonal Systems.
Interdisciplinary Science Reviews , 40 (2), 143–165.
Kirby, S. (2013). Transitions: The Evolution of Linguistic Replicators. In
P. M. Binder & K. Smith (Eds.), The language phenomenon: Human
communication from milliseconds to millennia (pp. 121–138). Berlin
and Heidelberg: Springer.
Kirby, S., & Hurford, J. (2002). The Emergence of Linguistic Structure: An
Overview of the Iterated Learning Model. In A. Cangelosi & D. Parisi
(Eds.), Simulating the evolution of language (pp. 121–148). London:
Springer.
Kirke, A. J. (2011). Application of Multi-Agent Whale Modelling to an
Interactive Saxophone and Whales Duet. Proceedings of International
Computer Music Conference, 350–353.
Lerdahl, F. (1992, January). Cognitive Constraints on Com-
positional Systems. Contemporary Music Review , 6 (2), 97–
121. Retrieved from http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10
.1080/07494469200640161 doi: 10.1080/07494469200640161
MacCallum, R. M., Mauch, M., Burt, A., & Leroi, A. M. (2012). Evolution
of music by public choice. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sci-
ences , 109 (30), 12081–12086. Retrieved from http://www.pnas.org/
content/early/2012/06/12/1203182109.abstract doi: 10.1073/
13
pnas.1203182109
Miller, G. (2000). Evolution of Human Music Through Sexual Selec-
tion. In N. L. Wallin, B. Merker, & S. Brown (Eds.), The ori-
gins of music (pp. 329–360). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. doi:
10.1177/004057368303900411
Miranda, E. R. (2004). At the Crossroads of Evolutionary Computation
in Music: Self-Programming Synthesizers, Swarm Orchestras and the
Origins of Melody. Evolutionary Computation, 12 (2), 137–158. doi:
10.1162/106365604773955120
Miranda, E. R. (2014). Harnessing the Intelligence of Physarum Poly-
cephalum for Unconventional Computing-Aided Musical Composition.
International Journal of Unconventional Computing , 10 (3), 251–268.
Miranda, E. R., Kirby, S., & Todd, P. M. (2003). On Computational Models
of the Evolution of Music: From the Origins of Musical Taste to the
Emergence of Grammars. Contemporary Music Review , 22 (2), 91–110.
Mithen, S. (2006). The Singing Neanderthals: The Origins of Music, Lan-
guage, Mind and Body. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
Morley, I. (2012). Hominin Physiological Evolution and the Emergence of
Musical Capacities. In N. Bannan (Ed.), Music, language, and human
evolution (pp. 109–141). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Narmour, E. (1990). The Analysis and Cognition of Basic Melodic Structures:
The Implication-Realization Model. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
O¨zcan, E., & Erc¸al, T. (2008). A Genetic Algorithm for Generating Impro-
vised Music. In N. Monmarche´, E.-G. Talbi, P. Collet, M. Schoenauer,
& E. Lutton (Eds.), Artificial evolution (Vol. 4926, pp. 266–277). Berlin
and Heidelberg: Springer. Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10
.1007/978-3-540-79305-2\ 23 doi: 10.1007/978-3-540-79305-2\ 23
Parsons, E. C. M., Wright, A. J., & Gore, M. A. (2008). The Nature of Hump-
back Whale (Megaptera novaeangliae) Song. Journal of Marine Ani-
mals and Their Ecology , 1 , 22–31. Retrieved from http://www.oers
.ca/journal/Volume1/issue1vol1-2008-JMATE.pdf\#page=23
Payne, K. (2000). The Progressively Changing Songs of Humpback Whales:
A Window on the Creative Process in a Wild Animal. In N. L. Wallin,
B. Merker, & S. Brown (Eds.), The origins of music (pp. 135–150).
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Popper, K. (1959). The Logic of Scientific Discovery. London: Hutchinson.
Ridley, M. (2004). Evolution (3rd ed.). Oxford: Blackwell.
Shapiro, L. A. (2011). Embodied Cognition. London: Routledge.
Snyder, B. (2000). Music and Memory: An Introduction. Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press.
14
Tolbert, E. (2001, April). Music and Meaning: An Evolutionary Story.
Psychology of Music, 29 (1), 84–94. Retrieved from http://pom
.sagepub.com/cgi/doi/10.1177/0305735601291006 doi: 10.1177/
0305735601291006
Velardo, V., & Vallati, M. (2016). Beyond Anthropocentric Creativity: A
General Framework for Describing Creative Systems. In International
conference on tools with artificial intelligence (p. Under review).
Whitehead, H., & Rendell, L. (2014). The Cultural Lives of Whales and
Dolphins. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
15
